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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 870136 
v* : 
JACK NEIL COLONNA, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, after a jury trial in the Third Judicial 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987). 
£1&TEM£HT^QE^ISSU£S„PEISIN1ED.QH^&E£EAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Was defendant entrapped as a matter of law? 
2. Did the conduct of the undercover officer violate 
defendants right to due process under the federal or state 
constitution? 
3. Did defendant receive effective assistance of 
counsel at trial? 
5XMEBENI-fiE-XiI£-CAS£ 
Defendant, Jack Neil Colonna, was charged with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 76-6-302(1)(a) (1978), and theft from a person under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-404, -412 (1978) (R. 12-13). After a jury trial on 
only the former charge, defendant was found guilty of that 
offense (R. 62) . The Court sentenced defendant to the Utah State 
Prison for a term of five years to life with a consecutive term 
of one year for use of a firearm, and ordered him to pay $425.00 
in restitution (R. 70-71). 
£T&TEM£EI_QF_F&£Ti3 
Conflicting evidence was introduced at the trial of 
this case. The testimony of the State's witnesses and that of 
defendant's witness, which differ significantly in certain 
respects, are summarized below. 
Michael Droubay, an undercover narcotics officer with 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office and the State's chief 
witness, testified on direct examination to the following facts. 
On December 17, 1986 at approximately 7:30 p.m., Droubay met with 
Charles Webber, a paid drug informant, at the residence of Reed 
Rudy in Salt Lake County. When Droubay arrived at the residence, 
Webber told him that he had arranged to buy a quarter-pound of 
marijuana from two individuals who were present. However, 
because Droubay did not have sufficient money to make the 
purchase, he and Webber informed the individuals that they would 
have to deal at some other time. Droubay and Webber then tried 
to persuade Rudy to secure some cocaine for purchase by 
telephone. 
At approximately 8:00 p.m., defendant and another 
individual, Manny East, arrived. Defendant walked into the 
kitchen where the group was situated and brandished a cocked .44 
caliber revolver in Webber's face, saying, "How do you like this, 
you mother fucker?" Defendant then walked around the table, 
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pointed the gun at Rudyfs face, and said "something about not 
snitching [them] off to the West Valley cops anymore/ This 
activity caused Droubay to discreetly draw his own revolver which 
was concealed in the back of his pants, but he refrained from 
using it at that time (R. 106-07, 109-11, 113-21) • 
Shortly thereafter, East entered the kitchen. In 
response to East's inquiry about why they were there, Droubay and 
Webber indicated that they were looking for some cocaine. At 
this time, everyone, including defendant and East, were drinking 
beer. Defendant appeared to have been drinking prior to his 
arrival. After East contacted someone by telephone about 
cocaine, he, defendant, and Droubay left Rudy's residence and, 
with Droubay driving, went in Droubay's vehicle to a convenience 
store where, at East's request, Droubay bought a twelve-pack of 
beer. Upon leaving the store and driving towards the location 
where cocaine was to be purchased, the group was pulled over by 
police officers. Droubay, who drove throughout the evening, 
surreptitiously identified himself to the officers who, pursuant 
to Droubay's request, "rousted" him and issued him a citation. 
At the conclusion of this incident, defendant asked Droubay 
whether he was a police officer, to which Droubay responded in 
the negative (R. 128-32). 
Once the group reached their destination, Droubay gave 
East money for the purchase of cocaine. East exited the vehicle 
and entered the residence; defendant and Droubay remained behind. 
In Droubay's opinion, defendant, who had been constantly drinking 
beer, exhibited "escalated" behavior at this point. East 
returned with the cocaine and ingested some with defendant and 
Droubayf Droubay only simulating ingestion of the substance. 
Defendant's behavior continued to "escalate," They then drove 
back to Rudy's residence where, after again making contact with 
Rudy and Webber, more cocaine was ingested by defendant, East and 
the others, Droubay again simulated ingestion of the substance. 
East then began talking about persons who had apparently "ripped 
off" part of his drug distribution territory and approached 
Droubay on the subject. Defendant "parroted" East's complaints 
about the person who had allegedly wronged him (R. 132-43)• 
At approximately 10:00 p.m.f Droubay, defendant, East, 
and Webber left the Rudy residence in Droubay's vehicle. After 
Webber was dropped off at his home, East and defendant again 
talked about the person who had "ripped them off" and for the 
first time identified that person as Craig Britton. At Droubay's 
suggestion, the three drove to a bar for a beer, Droubay hoping 
to get to a phone to alert someone about the situation. There, 
they consumed a pitcher of beer before leaving. Droubay was 
unable to make a phone call, but East contacted Britton and 
arranged a meeting for that night. Defendant was sufficiently 
"wound up" by this time that he seemingly ignored Droubay's 
requests to calm down. Although neither East nor defendant had 
explained in detail how they (or East) had been "ripped off" by 
Britton, East appeared bent on resolving his dispute with 
Britton. Once back in his car with defendant and East, Droubay 
believed he had three options: (1) identify himself as a police 
officer and take the situation from there; (2) attempt to remove 
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himself from the situation in any way possible; or (3) remain 
with defendant and East and maintain the situation to the best of 
his ability. Droubay chose the third option and at East's 
direction began driving toward Brittonfs residence (R. 145-52). 
Upon arrival at Brittonfs residence. East and 
defendant, whose behavior had continued to "escalate," quickly 
exited the vehicle. Defendant had placed the .44 calibre 
revolver displayed earlier that evening in his belt. Defendant, 
East, and Droubay then entered the residence, and defendant began 
yelling loudly for Britton. Droubay observed Britton in the 
kitchen with East and defendant, East questioning Britton about 
the location of his "dope" and money. Defendant pointed his 
cocked revolver at Britton and "screamed at him about how they 
had been friends for a long time, and why would [Britton] do this 
to him and do this to [East]." Apparently informed as to the 
location of either drugs or money by something Britton said, East 
left the room. Because defendant continued to point his gun at 
Britton and Droubay was uncertain whether defendant would 
actually fire a shot, Droubay discreetly drew his own revolver 
and held it where defendant could not see it. East then returned 
with a revolver and an ammunition belt which he threw on the 
table. After returning his gun to the back of his pants, Droubay 
obtained the revolver from East, unloaded it, and threw it down a 
set of stairs. Subsequently, defendant, East, Britton, and 
Droubay entered Britton's bedroom, where Britton removed a small 
quantity of marijuana from a dresser and handed it to East. 
Once all four had returned to the kitchen, Droubay was handed a 
man's wallet which when opened revealed some money that East 
immediately took. Apparently in reference to the problem 
concerning the drug territory, defendant told Britton, "Don't 
ever fuck us over again." Britton and defendant, who continued 
to point his gun at Britton, became agitated with each other, 
causing Droubay to ask both to settle down. When Britton and 
defendant both stood up, Droubay stepped between them, pushed 
down the barrel of defendant's gun, pushed Britton back into a 
chair, slapped him across the face, and told him that he had 
"better listen to what these people had to say." However, 
defendant began shouting again, causing Droubay to pick up a 
black leather jacket he had seen on a chair, walk over to 
defendant, tell him to sit down, and ask him to look at the 
jacket. Defendant picked up the jacket, said, "This will fit 
me," and then placed it in on a nearby table. This seemed to 
calm the situation, until Britton started to speak to defendant. 
Droubay grabbed Britton's hand, applied pressure to his fingers 
in a hold commonly used by police officers on patrol, and again 
requested that he sit down, be quiet, and listen to what 
defendant and East had to say. Britton complied. Shortly 
thereafter, defendant, East, and Droubay left Britton's 
1 Droubay's initial testimony on this matter was not entirely 
clear on who removed the marijuana from the dresser or to whom it 
was given (R. 162). However, at one point when referring to the 
marijuana, Droubay stated, "I think [Britton] was the one that 
[sic] pulled it out [of the dresser] and handed it to Mr. East" 
(R. 169) . 
residence, taking with them the money, the marijuana, and the 
revolver Droubay had thrown down the stairs (East, who had 
retrieved the weapon, apparently had all the items in his 
possession) (R. 153-70). 
At approximately 1:30 a.m., defendant, East, and 
Droubay divided up the property taken from Britton. As his 
share, Droubay received about two and three-quarters ounces of 
marijuana and one hundred dollars in cash, which were later 
turned over to an evidence officer. Droubay then drove defendant 
and East to the Rudy residence, left them there, and had no 
further contact with them that evening (R. 172-74) • 
On cross-examination of Droubay, the following evidence 
was developed. Droubay knew that there was a good chance that 
defendant and East would show up at the Rudy residence the night 
of the incident. He decided to remain with defendant and East 
because he suspected that something like what eventually occurred 
with Britton might happen, and he thought it would be better to 
be present if such an incident were to occur. Consistent with 
the department policy that alcohol but not controlled substances 
could :be ingested by an officer on duty for vice or narcotics, 
Droubay had consumed approximately three beers during the 
evening. He recalled striking Britton twice or less, but denied 
ever threatening to cut off Britton's fingers. Finally, Droubay 
admitted that he provided defendant and East with beer, the money 
and opportunity to consume cocaine, and transportation to all 
locations visited by the three of them that night (R. 235-37, 
245, 251, 255, 257). 
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Craig Britton, a witness for the State, testified to 
the following facts. On the evening of December 17, 1986, East, 
who had previously lived with Britton, called him and asked if he 
and defendant could come to Britton's residence to get some 
marijuana. Britton indicated that that was all right. Sometime 
thereafter, East, defendant, and Droubay were in his house and 
awakened him. Generally, the events that followed were as 
described by Droubay; however, Britton recalled that during the 
incident, Droubay struck him approximately five times, threatened 
to cut off his fingers, took the money out of his wallet, told 
defendant to take his jacket, and wanted to take his rifle but 
did not due to defendant's protest. Britton was most afraid of 
Droubay who, as did defendant and East, appeared to have been 
drinking and to be "messed up." Before he left Britton's house, 
defendant shook Britton's hand and apologized for the situation. 
Finally, Britton did not authorize the taking of his gun, 
marijuana, or money (R. 182-83, 187-88, 190, 192, 196-97, 199, 
203) . 
Kendra Herlynn, a narcotics officer with the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office and a witness for the State, testified 
that when she talked with Droubay at approximately 1:30 p.m. the 
afternoon after the incident, Droubay was "notably irrational" 
and "emotionally distraught." When she met with Droubay about an 
hour later, he was gray and nauseous, sweating profusely, 
shaking, pacing, and had a cracking voice. It was Herlynn's 
opinion that Droubay had been drinking beers, but had not 
ingested any other intoxicant, and that his condition was 
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attributable to the trauma of the incident the night before. She 
stated that there was no internal department policy prohibiting 
the consumption of alcohol by an officer during an undercover 
operation (R. 207-09, 225-27, 229). 
Defendant's only witness, Reed Rudy, who had known 
defendant since childhood, testified that when defendant came 
into his house with a gun, "he was just playing around with 
everybody," and when he pointed the gun at Webber, defendant only 
said, "How do you like the barrel on this?" Rudy, who admitted 
that he was "always drinking beer," claimed that on the night in 
question Droubay arrived at the residence with beer and drank it 
there, smoked marijuana that he had with him, drew lines of 
cocaine for everyone, and ingested cocaine (R. 265-69). 
SUMMA£X_QF_££SUMENT 
Under the pertinent statutory provision and the 
relevant case law, defendant was not entrapped as a matter of 
law. 
Defendant's due process claim was not preserved for 
review. Even if the Court were to address the issue, defendant 
is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction. The undercover 
officer's conduct was not so outrageous as to violate defendant's 
right to due process. 




DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF 
HIS CONVICTION ON THE BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT. 
Defendant argues that he is entitled to a reversal of 
his conviction because the undercover officer, Droubay, entrapped 
him as a matter of law. This claim lacks merit. 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-2-303(1) (1978) provides: 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission for prosecution by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the 
offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely 
affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
It embodies the objective standard for determining entrapment. 
StaiS-Yx-EiicJssSD, 722 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1986) (citing £iai£_JU 
Xaxlfilr 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979)). "This standard focuses solely 
on the fairness of police conduct (as opposed to the 
predisposition of a defendant to commit a crime)." Ikisl. £££ 
al&Q Sifl££_iU_Iid£lI r 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986). 
The jury rejected defendant's defense of entrapment and 
found him guilty of the charged offense. In reviewing that 
decision, this Court views the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the verdict. MfiUf 728 P.2d at 133; SJtfli£«XA.M5tJtiD# 713 
P«2d 60, 61 (Utah 1986). Accordingly, defendant's recitation of 
the facts, which in a number of respects refers only to the 
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evidence most favorable to him,^ does not provide compelling 
support for his entrapment claim. Although Droubay may have been 
guilty of poor judgment in supplying defendant with alcohol and 
cocaine (in view of defendant's "escalated" behavior) , providing 
transportation to defendant and East, and participating in the 
robbery to the extent that he did, none of his conduct indu££jl 
defendant to commit the crime by "creating a substantial risk 
that the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it." Nothing in the record suggests that defendant would 
not have participated in the robbery had it not been for the beer 
and cocaine given him by Droubay. And, the purchase of alcohol 
and drugs, and sharing them with suspected drug traffickers, are 
not unreasonable police conduct in an undercover operation, the 
purpose of which is to infiltrate a drug distribution network. 
1
 For example, defendant states as fact that Droubay "brought 
marijuana to the Reed [sic] house," that "[h]e hit Mr. Britton 
three or four times in the back of the head and twice on the 
nose," and that "hie] pulled Mr. Britton's fingers apart and 
threatened to cut one off." Br. of App. at 15, 19. Indeed, Reed 
Rudy testified that Droubay arrived at his house with marijuana, 
and Craig Britton testified that the latter incidents occurred; 
however, Droubay testified under oath that he did not have any 
controlled substances in his possession when he first arrived at 
the Rudy residence (R. 123), that he hit Britton twice or less 
that evening (R. 255), and that he never threatened to cut off 
Britton's fingers (R. 255). Similarly, defendant's factual 
conclusion that Droubay ingested cocaine because he could not 
possibly have simulated the ingestion of that substance in the 
manner described is nothing more than a personal opinion based on 
his assessment of contradictory testimony and the inferences he 
chooses to draw therefrom. 
Contrary to the implication in defendant's entrapment 
argument, the jury simply was not obligated to believe the 
testimony most favorable to defendant and reject contradictory 
testimony favorable to the State. £££ State v. Underwood, 737 
P.2d 995, 996 (Utah 1987); State v. Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 
(Utah 1987). 
Those tactics may be reasonably necessary to gain the confidence 
of the investigations targets,3 and therefore# under the 
circumstances, did not "fall[ ] below standards, to which common 
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power•" 
StflJtfi^ Yji^ Taylfil 9 599 P.2d at 500. Nor does the evidence, when 
viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, demonstrate that 
Droubay either manufactured the crime or actively encouraged 
defendant to commit the crime; rather, defendant acted at East's 
behest, not Droubay's. And, East was in no way directed by 
Droubay* For the most part, Droubay's conduct merely afforded 
defendant an opportunity to commit the offense, a circumstance 
that does not constitute entrapment. S 76-2-303(1)• 
Although Droubay1s participation in the robbery was 
questionable, it did not amount to an inducement under the 
circumstances; there appeared to be no substantial causal 
connection between his conduct and defendant's commission of the 
crime. Indeed, from Droubayfs testimony, it seems clear that 
much of what he did was intended to prevent (and may well have 
prevented) any physical harm to either Britton (the robbery 
victim) or defendant. Furthermore, Droubay's act of remaining 
with defendant and East throughout the evening did not constitute 
unacceptable police conduct. In general, it is a socially 
3
 £££ Hampton v. United States, 426 U.S. 484 (1976) (where the 
Supreme Court affirmed a conviction when the defendant contended 
that a government informant had supplied heroin so that the 
defendant could sell it to government agents); id. at 491-92 
(Powell, J., concurring) (recognizing that the practicalities of 
law enforcement sometimes compel officers to provide supplies to 
drug manufacturing operations or even to supply "contraband 
itself"). 
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justifiable policy to allow an undercover officer, who finds 
himself or herself in the presence of persons who are about to 
commit a crime which is completely of their own design, to remain 
with those persons throughout the commission of the crime, and 
even participate in the criminal activity to whatever limited 
extent is necessary to protect his or her cover, in order to 
gather evidence against the offending individuals. One could 
hardly argue that this would not be an effective means of 
combating crime with no intrusion on a protected right of the 
offenders.* 
In short, 
the evidence, when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, does not 
support the conclusion that the methods used 
by [Droubay] created a substantial risk that 
the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it. None of the 
personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals 
to extreme vulnerability present in recent 
entrapment cases before this Court existed in 
this case. £>£g SiaJt£.yA-Ciipps, Utah 692, 
P.2d 747 (1984); £iaifi_Y.±_.Spi33il£ r Utah, 680 
P.2d 404 (1984); Siaifi-V^Isylfll# Utah, 599 
P.2d 496 (1979) . 
Stflifi^ Yx-MfltJtint 713 P.2d at 62. Defendant's opinions as to what 
Droubay could have done differently, although perhaps well-taken, 
* That the crime of which defendant was ultimately convicted did 
not directly involve the distribution of controlled substances is 
not critical* Contrary to defendant's suggestion, public policy 
does not demand that an officer who, like Droubay, is engaged in 
an undercover drug operation be limited to ferreting out drug 
offenses only and thus prohibited from investigating other 
criminal activity that may present itself during that operation. 
An officer should be free to investigate any criminal activity, 
regardless of that officer's particular assignment. If 
defendant's position were accepted, society's interest in 
effective and legitimate law enforcement would be seriously 
compromised. 
do not change the analysis. And, his theory that the robbery 
would not have occurred without Droubay's involvement, beyond 
being sheer speculation, is not really pertinent. The point is 
the robbery occurred, and the only question is whether defendant 
was entrapped. Under the relevant legal standards, he was not. 
Finally, defendant's discussion of the possible 
application of S 76-2-303(2) to his case need not be considered 
by the Court. Because the State never asserted that section as a 
bar to defendant's entrapment defense in the trial court, and 
indeed itself requested an instruction on entrapment (Plaintiff's 
Requested Jury Instruction No. (R. 32-33)), the issue 
concerning the applicability of § 76-2-303(2) should not be 
addressed. Cf • S±fii£_yjL_Jisl>2Pr 7 5 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 3 4-35, 
P.2d , (1988) (because prosecutor, defense counsel, and 
trial court proceeded under 1983 version of statute, although 
1984 statute was perhaps technically applicable to trial 
procedures, State could not assert on appeal that 1984 statute 
controlled case). 
PQIN1-IJ 
THE UNDERCOVER OFFICER'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
ROBBERY WAS NOT SO OUTRAGEOUS AS TO VIOLATE 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
As an alternative to his entrapment claim, defendant 
argues that his conviction should be reversed because the 
undercover officer's involvement in the robbery was so outrageous 
that it denied defendant due process of law under the federal 
and/or state constitutions. Because this issue is raised for the 
first time on appeal, it should not be considered. jSiaifi-Xx 
-14-
SifiSSSllr 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). Even if the Court 
addresses the question, although some of defendant's criticisms 
of Droubay's participation in the crime are justified, reversal 
of his conviction is not warranted. 
In UDii£d_Si3i§s_y.L_Rugs£ll, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 
(1973), the United States Supreme Court recognized that there may 
be "situationls] in which the conduct of law enforcement agents 
is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar 
the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a 
conviction." Although a plurality of the Court in H^mpi2D»Yx 
J2fli.t£d_£.tflJt£S f 425 U.S. 484 (1976) , concluded that the outrageous 
conduct defense was not available to a defendant who was 
predisposed to commit the crime, i<J. at 490, a majority of the 
Court rejected this view and recognized that the defense was 
available under certain circumstances irrespective of the 
defendant's predisposition, i$2. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., 
concurring, joined by Blackmun, J#); i&. at 497 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, J.J.)* In the 
federal system, the outrageous conduct defense is a separate and 
alternative defense to entrapment—the entrapment defense being 
available only to a defendant who does not have a predisposition 
to commit the crime.5 In those jurisdictions that have adopted 
5 Although there has been a lively debate on the issue of whether 
the objective or subjective standard for entrapment should be 
adopted in the federal courts, £&£ United States v. Russell, 411 
U.S. 423, 439-50 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495-500 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting), the Supreme Court has adopted the subjective 
approach, Bufififill, 411 U.S. at 433. 
the o b j e c t i v e approach t o entrapment , such as Utah, the 
outrageous conduct d e f e n s e i s e s s e n t i a l l y an e x t e n s i o n of the 
t r a d i t i o n a l entrapment d e f e n s e which f o c u s e s "on whether the 
p o l i c e conduct r e v e a l e d in the p a r t i c u l a r c a s e f a l l s below 
s t a n d a r d s , t o which common f e e l i n g s re spond , for the proper use 
of governmental power." £ i a i £ _ y A _ l a y l £ I t 599 P.2d a t 500 . £££ 
fllSfi BdfflPJtfiD.v^^yDiJtSd-SiaifiJB # 425 U.S . a t 496-97 (Brennan, J . , 
d i s s e n t i n g ) . In ££ai£_iLi_Fi i££l , 744 F.2d 1 3 6 6 , 1369 (Utah 1 9 8 7 ) , 
t h i s Court in dictum c i t e d Rygfifill and r e c o g n i z e d t h a t under 
c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s ou trageous p o l i c e conduct may c o n s t i t u t e a 
due p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n . Although t h i s Court has not e l a b o r a t e d on 
t h i s p r i n c i p l e , most f e d e r a l c o u r t s have s t a t e d t h a t "the due 
p r o c e s s channel which BuSSfill kept open i s a most narrow o n e , " 
UDii£d_££a££S_Y.i_£££Qb£ig# 803 F.2d 4 2 2 , 429 (9 th C i r . 1986) 
(quot ing UDiJt£d_£iaJt£_Yj._£i!ai}r 548 F.2d 7 8 2 , 789 (9 th C i r . ) , 
£ £ ! £ • d£Di£d# 429 U . S . 939 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , and 430 U . S . 965 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ) , and 
"a due p r o c e s s v i o l a t i o n w i l l be found only in the r a r e s t and 
most ou trageous c i r c u m s t a n c e s , " U D i £ e 3 _ £ i a £ £ S _ v ^ & t ^ a g a § 807 
F.2d 4 2 4 , 426 (5th C i r . 1986) ( f o o t n o t e c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . Sfi£ 
SlSfl flni*Sd-S£flJfceS-X*_SbfiffMI# 826 F.2d 6 1 9 , 626 (7th C i r . ) , 
Cfil ix 3£Di£i3# 108 S. C t . 356 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ; Unii£3_£Jtai£S_i*_i?a£i3 # 793 
F.2d 5 5 1 , 554 (3d C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) . 
A common theme running through the case law in this 
area is that a due process violation will not be found unless 
there are both government over involvement in the charged crime 
and a relatively passive role by the defendant. Alifiaair 807 
F*2d at 427. Where there is significant independent involvement 
-16-
by the defendant, the criminal activity is initiated by the 
defendant, or the criminal enterprise is underway before the 
government agent becomes involved, a due process violation is 
unlikely. £££ UDii£<3_SJU:US_Y.i_SilDBSfiIJ# 813 F.2d 1462, 1470-71 
(9th Cir.), cert* dfiflifidr 108 S. Ct. 233 (1987); Unii£s3_£:tfiJ;££_X* 
MilfllDf 817 F.2d 1113, 1115-16 (4th Cir. 1987); Ward, 793 F,2d at 
554-55. As noted in £i£Dk£I35 
Constitutionally unacceptable conduct 
includes, but is not limited to, situations . 
• • where "government agents engineer and 
direct the criminal enterprise from start to 
finish," yBii£d_g£gtes_y
-1_RM».ii:£.Z # 710 F.2d 
535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983), and where the 
government essentially manufacturers new 
crimes in order to obtain the defendant's 
conviction, s££ id. at 540; [UDli£d-SJtflJt£S 
Xxl.Bfigflii, 783 F.2d [1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 
1986)1. 
803 F.2d at 429. Although in some respects questionable, 
particularly with regard to some of the physical and verbal 
conduct he directed toward Britton, Droubayfs involvement in the 
robbery, when viewed in light of the standards discussed above, 
was not so outrageous as to constitute a due process violation 
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 
He merely attached himself to criminal activity clearly initiated 
and directed by defendant and East. Even though some of what 
Droubay did is not to be condoned, the courts should be reluctant 
to exercise ••a chancellors foot1 veto over law enforcement 
practices of which it [does] not approve." UDiJt£$3_SJtflJt£S-Y* 
BUfiflfillr 411 U.S at 435. Sfi£ 3l52 £iffl£S£D# 813 F.2d at 1468; 
iteld/ 793 F.2d at 554. As stated by the court in BDit£$3.5iai£S 
y-i_Sh£i£D£i: 
(0]ur job is not to censure police officers 
for every act of questionable conduct in 
which they engage—we leave that to those 
with direct responsibility for supervision of 
the officers involved. Our job is to 
interpret the Constitution. 
826 F*2d at 626. Some criticism of Droubayfs conduct by the 
Court is probably justified, but reversal on due process grounds 
is unwarranted. What police misconduct is present "undoubtedly 
arose from poor judgment rather than bad faith or malice, and it 
did not breach any right of this defendant." ££aie_y
-1._jPfiQi£i, 
255 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 1977). This is not a case of 
manufactured crime, and therefore is distinguishable from those 
cases where prosecution was barred because the government 
"involveld] itself so directly and continuously over such a long 
period of time in the creation and maintenance of criminal 
operations" as to make prosecution "repugnant to American 
criminal justice." Sl££D£_VjL_Uni£££LS£a££St 454 F.2d 783, 787 
(9th Cir# 1971) (where government agents collaborated with a 
suspected criminal to establish an illegal bootlegging operation 
and then sustained the operation, acting as both the supplier and 
sole customer of the illegal operation it had created) . £££ jBlS2 
Ufli£fid_S£fil£S_YA_Jiass r 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (where 
government agents established and supplied a narcotics laboratory 
in order to arrest a suspect who was at the time "lawfully and 
peacefully minding his own affairs"). Finally, there is no 
textual or public policy reason for analyzing this due process 
issue differently under article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Const i tut i on. S&S Yflli_Cfinxai£S££Di_4_Cai£-lD££iJtU£ifln_X* 
IndUStlifli-CflmiBiSSifiDr 649 P.2d 33, 35-36 (Utah 1982) ("This 
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Court has held that decisions relating to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution are 
highly persuasive when interpreting the due process clause of the 
Utah Constitution."). 
MIMLJJI 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF 
HIS CONVICTION FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL. 
Defendant argues that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel at trial because counsel (1) "failed to 
adequately prepare for trial as a result of his failure to 
properly plea bargain;" (2) "failed to adequately present the 
defense of entrapment;" (3) "failed to object or move for 
mistrial after officer alluded to past offenses of Mr. Colonna in 
direct testimony;" and (4) "fail[ed] to move to dismiss the 
information based on the officer's outrageous conduct." 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel 
justifying reversal of a conviction, "it is the defendant's 
burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner; and (2) that the outcome 
of the trial would probably have been different but for counsel's 
error." Sifltfi-^ -Sfifliy, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). As 
summarized in £iflJt£_yA_Elflm£# 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986): 
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant 
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's 
representation falls below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. C2diADB3_X* 
Mollis* 6609 P.2d 1101, 1108-09 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant must prove that specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the 
wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. The claim may not be 
speculative, but must be a demonstrative 
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reality, sufficient to overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised "reasonable 
professional judgment," SilielslaQd-Yx 
W35l)iD3i2Ur 466 U.S 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
2066, 80- L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); S£s££ yA 
LailkYr 699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984). 
And, an unfavorable result does not compel a 
conclusion of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. £ia£g_yA_Bii£l # 700 P.2d at 703. 
Furthermore, any deficiency must be 
prejudicial to defendant. It is not enough 
to claim that the alleged errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome or could 
have had a prejudicial effect on the fact 
finders. To be found sufficiently 
prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively 
show that a "reasonable probability" exists 
that, but for counsel's error, the result 
would have been different. We have defined 
"reasonable probability" as that sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the reliability of 
the verdict. 
723 P.2d* at 405 -(footnote citation omitted). Defendant fails to 
satisfy this two-pronged standard on any of his ineffectiveness 
claims. 
Defendant's claim concerning the plea bargaining 
process in his case is disposed of by S£aJL§_Yx_S£3iy* There, the 
Court made clear that the standards relating to ineffective 
assistance of counsel do not apply to the plea bargaining 
process. It stated in this regard that "our state and federal 
constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains." 707 
P.2d at 646. 
Defendant's argument concerning entrapment is wholly 
speculative. This is obvious from the record, where, as conceded 
by defendant, the trial court specifically stated that had a 
pretrial entrapment motion been filed by counsel pursuant to 
§ 76-2-303(4), it would have been denied (R. 296-97). 
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Furthermoref trial counsel adequately presented the entrapment 
argument to the jury (R. 286-94). 
And, insofar as trial counsel%s performance was 
deficient for failing to object to passing references to 
defendant's past offenses, reversal is not warranted* Given the 
substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, the prejudice prong of 
the ineffectiveness test is not satisfied. Defendant does not 
demonstrate that the absence of the alleged deficiency "would 
give rise to a reasonable likelihood of a different result." 
SifliS-Yx-AlCllUleifl# 747 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Utah 1987). The alleged 
error does not "undermine confidence in the reliability of the 
verdict." flSffifir 723 P.2d at 405. Sfifi slSQ SiaJtg_.yJt_Lfliiky, 699 
P.2d 1187, 1205 (Utah 1984). 
Finally, in light of the discussion in Point I, 
defendant fails to meet either prong of the ineffectiveness test 
with respect to the alleged due process violation. 
CQHCLUSIQH 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed. ,^. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _/f_ day of March, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON ft 
Assistant Attorney General 
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